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INCOMMENSURABLE CHOICES AND THE PROBLEM
OF MORAL IGNORANCE
LEO KATZt
If I cannot decide between A and B, that would seem to show that
I am indifferent between them. But as Joseph Raz famously demon-
strated in The Morality of Freedom,' it does not show that at all. His
demonstration basically consisted of pointing to a feature of such
situations that previously had been overlooked completely. If I can-
not make up my mind between a Toyota and a Honda, it certainly
looks as though the reason I am dithering is that I am nearly indiffer-
ent between them. But consider, said Raz, that I would have no
problem making up my mind between one such Honda and another
such Honda that happened to be selling for a few dollars less. If I
were truly indifferent between the more expensive Honda and the
Toyota, Raz observed, then I should no longer be indifferent between
the cheaper Honda and that self-same Toyota: I should prefer the
cheaper Honda. But since I find choosing between the cheaper
Honda and the Toyota just as hard as choosing between the more
expensive Honda and the Toyota, something else must be going on.
What exactly is going on in such a case is, of course, quite myste-
rious. Hence this Symposium.
2 Everyone would, I think, agree that
what is going on has something to do with the fact that I find the
cheaper Honda easy to compare with the more expensive Honda, but
that I find either of the Hondas quite hard to compare with a Toy-
ota-they are just so different. They are, it seems, incommensurable.
My being unable to decide between the two cars thus seems not to
stem from my being in equipoise between them (otherwise a slight
drop in the price of the Honda immediately would break the tie), but
from my being unable to compare them properly.
t Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
'JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALMIY OF FREEDOM 321-66 (1986).
2 1 am using "incommensurability" to refer to what some prefer to call
"incomparability." See, e.g., Ruth Chang, Introduction, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOM-
PARABILITY, AND PRACncAL REASON 1 (Ruth Chang ed., 1997). I prefer that terminol-
ogy because it is better at evoking what I argue to be the root of the incommensurabil-
ity phenomenon in this Article.
(1465)
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In the first Part of this Article, I will try to show that the roots of
this mysterious-seeming incommensurability phenomenon are often
very mundane and that the problem of what to do about incommen-
surable choices is therefore often very easy to solve. To be more
precise, I will try to show that things have a way of seeming incom-
mensurable for no other reason than that the chooser happens to be
fairly uninformed about them. Once his ignorance is dispelled-as a
result of nothing more than a bit of sustained investigation and re-
flection-the incommensurability generally will disappear. In the
remainder of the Article, I will pursue some questions that arise out
of this: What is one to do if one has not yet been able to come by the
information or the insight that would make the incommensurability
disappear? And how bad is it if one gets things wrong?
I. How IGNORANCE LEADS TO INCOMMENSURABILITY
The idea that incommensurability is simply a manifestation of ig-
norance is not original with me. Donald Regan has taken a line
somewhat like this in his extended essay on Raz's book.3 Here, I will
pursue the point farther than he does, as well as pursue the further
interesting questions to which it gives rise. The best way to explain
what I have in mind is with an example. Suppose we face the task of
comparing two irregularly shaped pieces of paper as to their size.
One of these pieces of paper resembles in outline the State of Texas,
the other the State of Idaho. To look at them, it seems possible that
they are equal in area, or that one of them is larger. There seems no
easy way to tell which is the case. Suppose now there exists a third
piece of paper, which in fact has the same shape as "Idaho," but on a
slightly smaller scale. We are now finding ourselves in a situation that
has all the earmarks of incommensurability. We are unable to choose
as between Texas and Idaho which is larger. We have no trouble
deciding that "big" Idaho is larger than "small" Idaho. Nevertheless,
this does not mean that we are able to choose between Texas and
"small" Idaho as to which is larger. The reason for this perceptual
kind of incommensurability seems to be the relative ease with which
we can compare the two Idaho shapes and the difficulty of comparing
either of those shapes with the Texas shape. Note, however, that the
3 Donald H. Regan, Authority and Value: Reflections on Raz's Morality of Freedom, 62
S. CAL. L. REV. 995, 995 (1989) (detailing general agreement with Raz because "[h]e
comes closer to the truth about political morality than anyone has for nearly a cen-
tury," but also elaborating on certain "tensions" in Raz's thought).
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incommensurability we have encountered here can be dispelled
relatively easily. All we need to do is to stop trying to make the judg-
ment by the eyeballing method and resort to more advanced measur-
ing instruments instead. The incommensurability here is simply the
result of ignorance: our inability to do with the naked eye what we
could easily do with some measuring tools. Dispel the ignorance and
you have eliminated the incommensurability.
In an implicit way, the law has, in fact, long recognized the inti-
mate connection between incommensurability and ignorance. Con-
sider the way the burden-of-proof rules operate in a civil case.
Imagine a plaintiff who makes an allegation and backs it up with the
meagerest of evidence. The defendant in turn denies it, offering no
evidence whatsoever. Under such circumstances, a court is obliged to
dismiss the case on the ground that the plaintiff has not met his
burden of proof. Let us explore a little bit what it means to say here
that the plaintiff has not met his burden of proof. It clearly does not
mean that the defendant has by a preponderance of the evidence
disproved the plaintiff's allegation. Rather, it means that the court
has not been provided enough information to be able to decide
which of the two sides is right. How should we think about the
judge's inability to decide which side is right? Are we to think of him
as being in equipoise between the two parties? Does the defendant
win because the plaintiff has only managed to put the case into equi-
poise rather than the "50%-plus-a-smidgen" range that would entitle
him to win? The burden-of-proof rules make it clear that the court's
inability to choose between the two sides does not show it to be in
equipoise: If such were the case, then the plaintiffs introduction of a
mere scintilla of additional evidence would entitle him to a favorable
judgment. It is quite clear, however, that much more is demanded of
him. The burden-of-proof rules thus treat the judge's inability to
decide as a sign of incommensurability rather than indifference.
In probability theory too, the connection between incommensur-
ability and ignorance long has been recognized. Somebody asserts a
proposition, the truth of which I have no idea. I am unable-to put
the matter with pedantic, but I think illuminating, clumsiness-to
decide between two alternatives: (1) the proposition is true; and (2)
the proposition is false. Does my inability to choose reflect that, given
how little information I have on the matter, each alternative is equally
likely? Although it is tempting to think so, that would lead to contra-
dictions. The root cause of those contradictions turns out to be the
14671998]
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fact that my inability to choose between the two alternatives reflects
not "indifference" but "incommensurability."
Consider the statement "Brian will win his next gamble." Not
having any evidence whatsoever on the matter-not even knowing
what kind of gamble is being contemplated-you might be inclined
to consider yourself "indifferent" on the issue and assign a 50% prob-
ability to the possibility that Brian will win, and a 50% probability to
the possibility that Brian will lose. Consider next the statement
"Brian will win a million dollars in his next gamble." This statement,
being more specific than the first statement, is less probable than the
first statement. Nevertheless, since you have no evidence on the
matter, you should consider yourself "indifferent" on the issue and
assign a 50% probability to the possibility that Brian will win a mil-
lion, and a 50% probability to the possibility that Brian will not. The
result, of course, is that you end up in a contradiction. Because, in
fact, you are not indifferent between the two possibilities, you are not
truly in equipoise. The two alternatives are simply incommensurable.
If I am right about the connection between incommensurability
and ignorance, then there should be many cases in which previously
incommensurable alternatives are rendered commensurable through
the influx of additional information or insight. And indeed, there is
no dearth of such cases. Every time a plaintiff backs his complaint up
with evidence, he turns an incommensurable choice into a commen-
surable one. But those are admittedly very mundane, factual kinds of
choices. What about incommensurable choices that have a heavier
moral tinge to them? Are there examples here too of incommensur-
ability being dispelled through insight or information? Let me sug-
gest a few.
A. Utility Measurement
Economists and utilitarians used to be much bothered by a very
basic kind of incommensurability: our inability to compare the hap-
piness derived from our first one thousand dollars with the happiness
derived from our last one thousand dollars. Intuitively, it seemed
right to say that the latter conferred much less joy than the former.
But no one felt that he had a truly secure grip on that comparison.
That insecurity was especially apparent when one was asked to
compare, say, the joy derived from having one's income jump from
$10,000 to $20,000 with the joy derived from having one's income
jump from $100,000 to $200,000. Those two kinds of joy seemed
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truly incommensurable. It was clear that the joy of seeing one's in-
come rise from $100,000 to $200,001 was greater than seeing it rise
from $100,000 to $200,000. Yet it did not therefore follow that that
joy was greater than the joy of seeing one's income rise from $10,000
to $20,000.
In the end, it turned out that our inability to compare these dif-
ferent quantities of happiness was much like our inability to compare
the size of two irregularly shaped pieces of paper. They are incom-
mensurable if we insist on settling the matter by eyeballing. They
become commensurable once we resort to more refined technology.
In the case of utility measurement, that technology was the
Von Neumann-Morgenstern approach to constructing a cardinal
utility function. By making the simple but very ingenious assumption
that everyone is trying to maximize his (statistically) expected utility
(regardless, that is, of its statistical distribution), and then asking
people to express their preferences among various easy-to-compare
gambles, Von Neumann and Morgenstern were able definitively to
answer questions thought to be inherently unanswerable. They were
able to compare things that had been incommensurable, and were
now actually in a position to say whether, for a given person, the jump
from $10,000 to $20,000 represented a greater or lesser increase in
happiness than the jump from $100,000 to $200,000.
B. The Concept of Desert
Incommensurability quickly rears its head when we talk about de-
sert. Is someone receiving more or less recognition than he deserves?
The incommensurability here seems so great that many think the
question vacuous. Here too, however, one can eliminate at least some
of the incommensurability (and with sustained effort maybe all of it)
by casting about for some appropriate measurement tools that would
allow us to do more than just "eyeball" the question.
Those measurement tools can be found in the criminal law, which
provides us with a highly developed set of rules for measuring
"negative desert," that is, blameworthiness. With just a little bit of
effort, those rules can be converted into a means of measuring
"positive desert," that is, praiseworthiness. The best way to demon-
strate this is to juxtapose the sorts of things we say about a group of
thugs committing a murder with what we say about a group of soldiers
killing for a just cause. The things we say turn out to be remarkably
symmetrical. About the thugs we say that those among them who
bring about harm by an act are worse than those who bring it about
14691998]
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by an omission; those who bring it about intentionally are worse than
those who bring it about recklessly; those who bring it about proxi-
mately are worse than those who bring it about more indirectly; those
who bring it about as a principal are worse than those who merely act
as an accomplice; those who complete the crime are worse than those
who merely attempt it. All of this would seem to apply equally when
we talk about soldiers fighting for a just cause. Those among them
who bring about a good consequence by an act are more praiseworthy
than those who merely do it by an omission, that is, by not stopping
others from doing so; those who bring it about intentionally are
better than those who bring it about inadvertently; those who bring it
about proximately are better than those who do so indirectly; those
who are the principals in the accomplishment of the valiant deed are
better than those who are mere accomplices; those who carry the
mission through are better than those who attempt but fail at it.
What is more, even some fairly intricate "blaming" rules have their
mirror image on the praise side. Take for instance the so-called
"legal impossibility" doctrine, which says that a would-be criminal who
commits what he mistakenly believes is a crime cannot be found
guilty of a criminal attempt, because the crime he attempted is
"legally impossible." By the same token, the would-be criminal's
mirror image, the would-be hero who attempts what he mistakenly
believes is a valiant deed, will not thereby earn much glory.
All of this should not be taken to imply that the symmetry be-
tween praise and blame is perfect. There are in fact many intriguing
asymmetries. Here are just a few of the more noteworthy ones. Take
first the defense of insanity. If the insanity defense operated symmet-
rically as between blame and praise, we would have to think worse of
Van Gogh's masterpieces, once we realize that if he had committed
crimes in the same frame of mind in which he "committed" his pic-
tures, he could not be convicted by reason of his insanity. In fact,
however, if anything, his insanity seems to increase the admiration we
feel for his accomplishment. Consider next the role of risk and effort
in the blaming and in the praising context. If they operated symmet-
rically, then just as we think better of the person who braved many
risks and expended much effort to achieve his worthy goals, we would
have to think worse of the criminal who braved many risks and ex-
pended much effort to achieve his unworthy goals. Which is, of
course, the opposite of what we do. Consider lastly how luck and
unintended consequences seem to play a different role with respect
to praise than they do with respect to blame. Just think of Newton's
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famous dictum that if he had seen farther than others, it was because
he had stood on the shoulders of giants. It is indeed a well-accepted
principle of praise that, as the mathematician Jacques Hadamard put
it, "[w]hen the discoverer of a certain fact hears that another scholar
has found a notable consequence of it, if this improvement has re-
quired some effort, the former will consider it not a failure but a
success: he has the right to claim his part in the new discovery."
4
This, however, would not seem to hold true on the blame side: We
would not generally blame a person who has committed a bad deed,
which then has further bad repercussions, for those repercussions.
Although the symmetry between praise and blame is thus far from
perfect, it is extensive enough that we can bring a good deal of order
to our previously chaotic intuitions about positive desert and answer a
fair number of questions about desert that previously seemed unan-
swerable. Questions such as whether Copernicus's credit is dimin-
ished by the fact that in light of the physics he knew, his unswerving
belief in his own system was probably unreasonable; or whether
Werner Heisenberg deserves credit for denying Hitler the atom bomb
by declining to invent it for him;5 or whether Frederick Banting de-
served the Nobel Prize in Medicine despite the peculiarly circuitous
route by which he stumbled onto the discovery of insulin.
6 Being able
to answer those questions makes the notion of desert much less vacu-
ous. It means that desert has become commensurable: We are able
to judge some rewards as being excessive or as being inadequate
where previously we were "incommensurably" undecided.
C. Valuing Lives
There is a great deal of inconsistency in the way we value lives.
Some scholars have tried to account for this as a manifestation of
incommensurability. Thus Cass Sunstein writes in his article on law
and incommensurability:
There are extraordinary disparities in federal expenditures for each
life saved. Some environmental programs prevent risks at enormous
cost; the government is willing to spend relatively little to stop other
4 JACQUES HADAMARD, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INVENTION IN THE MATHEMATICAL
FIELD 49 (1945).
5 SeeTHOMAS POWERS, HEISENBERG'S WAR 151 (1993).
6 See ALEXANDER KOHN, FORTUNE OR FAILURE: MISSED OPPORTUNITIES AND
CHANCE DISCOVERIES IN SCIENCE 156 (1989).
7 SeeLEO KATZ, ILL-GOTrEN GAINS 197-263 (1996) (discussing the measurement of
rewards).
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risks. All current efforts to produce uniformity in expenditures-under-
stood, for example, as equivalent amounts of dollar expenditures for
each statistical life saved-have failed.
Such phenomena may in the end reflect irrationality, confusion,
poor framing of relevant questions, interest-group power, or sheer
chance. But it would be useful to explore other possible explanations.
When people are thinking in these various ways, exactly what are they
doing?
We might hypothesize that [inconsistent] social valuation of envi-
ronmental goods comes partly from an insistence that diverse social
goods.., ought to be valued in different ways. With this hypothesis,
some apparent anomalies dissolve or become more readily explicable.
Some people, for example, insistently rebel against the idea that we
should see all of the following, environmentally related consequences as
"costs": unemployment, higher prices, greater poverty, dirtier air, more
cancer, respiratory problems, the loss of species. If we understand all
these things as "costs," to be assessed via the same metric, we will disable
ourselves from making important distinctions. It might be hypothesized
that when people refuse to trade off environmental quality and other
goods, they are making a claim about the diversity of goods and incom-
mensurability. They are claiming that one set of goods is superior to
another not in the sense that it is infinitely valuable, but in the sense
that it stands in a hierarchy of public values.8
Let us examine more closely what Sunstein has in mind with the
help of a famous example from Guido Calabresi:
After about a month of studying cases, I put to my first term torts
students a couple of hypothetical questions. The first concerns an "evil
deity." "Suppose," I ask my students, "such a deity were to appear to
you, as president of this country or as controller of our legal system, and
offer a gift, a boon, which would make life more pleasant, more enjoy-
able than it is today. The gift can be anything you want-be as idealistic,
or as obscene, or as greedy as you wish-except that it cannot save lives."
Later I will drop even that requirement. "The evil deity suggests that he
can deliver this gift in exchange for one thing.., the lives of one thou-
sand young men and women picked by him at random who will each
year die horrible deaths."
When I ask; "Would you accept?" my students almost uniformly an-
swer, "no." Indeed, they are shocked that one could even ask the ques-
tion. I then ask, quietly, what the difference is between this gift and the
automobile, which takes some fifty-five thousand lives each year.9
8 Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REv. 779,
835-37 (1994) (footnotes omitted).
9 GUIDO GALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTTUDES, AND THE LAw 1 (1985) (ellipsis in
original) (footnote omitted).
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This is a miniature version of the kind of inconsistency Sunstein was
talking about. Sunstein would like to account for this inconsistency
by invoking incommensurability. He would suggest that a different
metric applies when we are deciding whether to drive cars and when
we are deciding whether to take the evil deity up on his offer.
At first glance, it is not clear how the applicability of different
metrics brings incommensurability into the picture. In fact, it is not
clear that incommensurability lurks anywhere in Calabresi's example.
To be sure, the students who abhor the evil deity's offer, but who have
no trouble embracing the automobile, do indeed seem to be applying
a different "metric" when they are thinking about lives lost at the
deity's altar and lives lost on the road. The two kinds of losses are not
judged to be equal: The one kind of loss is considered worse than the
other. That is why one is tolerable and the other is not. By making
that judgment, however, the students show the two losses to be quite
commensurable. So how is it that Sunstein manages to find incom-
mensurability in such a situation?
Incommensurability gets into the picture once one takes account
of the hesitation students feel when Calabresi confronts them with his
hypothetical, and after they reject the evil deity's offer but welcome
the automobile. Then they start to reflect on the seeming oddity of
their position. They start to find it strange that it should matter
whether a loss is inflicted by having everyone drive a car or by having
the deity randomly pluck his victims. The students also might start to
notice that most people would prefer to live in a society in which an
evil deity plucks a thousand people at random each year than in a
society in which accidents kill 55,000 each year. They might further
think about the fact that if by spending a certain amount of money
they could either eliminate all traffic accidents or eliminate the evil
deity's annual prey, they would probably choose to spend it on traffic
accidents. Once they think about these things, the students will start
to feel undecided about whether it would be worse to accept the evil
deity's offer than to allow cars to be driven. And that indecision has
all the earmarks of incommensurability. The students have no trou-
ble judging that an offer by the deity exacting only 999 lives would be
better than one exacting 1000 lives. But that does not mean that they
therefore find the deity's 999-lives offer preferable to an arrangement
whereby 55,000 people die in traffic accidents each year.
My claim is that this incommensurability, like all the previous
ones I have discussed, can be traced to ignorance and can be elimi-
nated by dispelling that ignorance. What the students are ignorant of
14731998]
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are the properties of a nonconsequentialist, deontological morality.
Once they become familiar with these properties, they will no longer
view the choice between the deity's offer and the automobile as an
incommensurable one, but happily will follow their initial intui-
tions-to reject the deity and choose the car. To a deontologist,
there is nothing peculiar about treating the two kinds of arrange-
ments differently. To each of the worries that made the students
hesitate, the deontologist has an answer.
Start with the students' worry that it is strange that it should mat-
ter whether a loss is inflicted by having everyone drive a car or by
having the deity randomly pluck his victims. To a deontologist, the
way in which a loss is inflicted is hugely important. The hallmark of
the deontological creed is that certain kinds of tradeoffs are off-limits.
You cannot cut up one person to use his organs to save five others.
You cannot execute one prisoner to prevent the mob from rioting
and in the course of its riot killing several more innocents. You can-
not torture the terrorist's child to get him to reveal where he has
hidden the bomb. And so on. But when the deontologist prohibits
carving up the one for the sake of the many, or killing a prisoner to
protect innocents, or torturing a child to discover the whereabouts of
the bomb, he acknowledges that different ways of bringing about a
harm are morally different. When I do not carve someone up, I cause
the death of five. When I do carve him up, I cause the death of one.
Presumably the way in which I cause the death of the five (by letting
them die) is, by the deontologist's lights, better than the way in which
I would be causing the death of the one if I decided to save the five
(namely by plunging a knife into him). This contrast, then, makes it
no longer peculiar that we feel differently about deaths caused by
allowing automobiles to be driven than by authorizing the evil deity to
pluck a thousand victims each year.
Consider now the students' second reason for worrying whether
accepting the evil deity's offer truly is worse than putting up with
automobiles. They think about the fact that most people would
prefer to live in a society in which an evil deity plucks a thousand
people at random each year than in a society in which accidents kill
55,000 each year. This too is not very troubling to a deontologist.
Most people would prefer to live in a world in which one can be
carved up to save many, in which an innocent can be executed to
appease a lynch mob, in which a child can be tortured to find the
bomb. In such a society, lives saved are maximized, and by choosing
to live in such a society you maximize your chance of being among
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the survivors. This is simply a well-known counterintuitive aspect of
the deontological position.
Consider, finally, the students' third source of worry. They think
about the fact that if by spending a certain amount of money they
could either eliminate all traffic accidents or eliminate the evil deity's
annual prey, they probably would choose to spend the money on the
elimination of traffic accidents. Does that not clearly indicate that
putting up with automobiles is no better than accepting the evil
deity's offer? The deontologist would point out that if a negligent
manufacturer ends up killing fifty-five people in a year and a vicious
murderer ends up killing exactly one, and if we could only stop one
of them, we would probably try to stop the negligent manufacturer.
This would not show, however, that the manufacturer is worse than
the murderer. 0
Once he has been able to make these arguments, the deontologist
would, I think, have rendered the previously incommensurable
choice between allowing society to use cars and accepting the deity's
offer perfectly commensurable.
In the above three illustrations, I strove to show how one can
trace cases of incommensurability to simple ignorance. It is worth
pointing out, however, that one conversely can view many cases of
ignorance as being instances of incommensurability. People will
profess ignorance on many major moral questions: the death penalty,
abortion, euthanasia, affirmative action, the use of lethal devices to
protect private property, the felony-murder doctrine, and so on.
Each of these can be thought of as a choice among incommensur-
ables. We cannot decide between acceptance and condemnation, but
we are not in equipoise between them either. How do I know we are
not in equipoise? Well, just consider for a moment the person who
cannot decide whether to accept or condemn the death penalty. He
surely would find it easier to accept the death penalty for mass mur-
derers than for simple killers. Yet he probably would continue to feel
undecided about whether to accept or condemn the death penalty
even for mass murderers.
10 For more on the three counterintuitive attributes of a deontological morality,
see KATZ, supra note 7.
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II. HOW TOJUDGE DECISIONS MADE IN A STATE
OF UNAVOIDABLE IGNORANCE
When incommensurability is traceable to ignorance, it will often
of course be but a temporary state-with knowledge, it will disappear.
The problem is that decisions may have to be made before knowledge
arrives. What then? How is one to decide the matter? The answer
would seem to be: the best one can. And, if one truly has nothing to
go on, then one might as well throw dice (as Donald Regan has sug-
gested") or even resort to Mae West's solution. "Given the choice
between two evils," she said, "I choose the one I haven't tried before."
But what happens when knowledge does at last arrive and the choice
that we have made in its absence turns out to have been the wrong
one? The answer seems to be: nothing. If the decisionmaker did the
best he could, it seems he cannot be blamed. Or can he?
In the remainder of this Article, I shall try to persuade you that
very often the decisionmaker can be blamed all the same. The cases
of incommensurability that have most interested philosophers are
cases of moral, as opposed to factual, incommensurability. Although
cases of factual incommensurability exist aplenty-as I pointed out in
Part I, every litigated case, prior to the presentation of evidence, is an
instance of factual incommensurability-it is cases of moral incom-
mensurability that truly exercise people, like the questions of desert
and the valuation of lives discussed earlier. If I am right that those
are basically instances of moral ignorance, the person who makes
what proves with hindsight to have been the wrong choice between
"moral" incommensurables, will have to argue that his moral igno-
rance should excuse him. There is no doubt that the person who
makes the wrong choice by reason of factual ignorance will be ex-
cused. But moral ignorance is a different story. If I shoot you be-
cause I did not see you standing behind the curtain, I am free of
blame. I have acted out of factual ignorance. But if I shoot you
because I did not realize that I may not use lethal force to defend my
property, I have acted out of moral ignorance, and that is a quite
different matter.
The question then is whether one can be blamed for a moral mis-
take that one could not help making. Strange though it seems, the
criminal law has answered this question in the affirmative-that is
what it means to say that ignorance of the law is no excuse. But does
" See Donald Regan, Value, Comparability, and Choice, in INCOMMENSURABILITY,
INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACncAL REASON, supra note 2, at 129.
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anyone really believe that principle, especially when it is construed as
a moral principle, as saying that ignorance of a moral law-or just
simply ignorance of morality-is no excuse? Is the principle not
simply a crude utilitarian means for discouraging people from re-
maining willfully ignorant of the law so as to get away with their mis-
deeds?
No, it really does seem as though the principle comports with the
way we judge misconduct. Think back to the infamous Milgram
experiment. '2 Most of the people who obliged the experimenter and
continued pressing buttons that they thought would inflict severe
electric shocks on the uncooperative learner-those concentration
camp guards manqus-did not enjoy doing what they did. In fact,
when the experimenter gave them half a chance to cheat and not
inflict the required shocks, they did. They went through agonies.
They only continued pressing the buttons because they felt that that
was what morality required of them. Yet, we are willing to condemn
them for their weakness, despite the fact that it seems to have been
the product of moral ignorance. To be sure, some might argue that
we blame them only because they should have known better; that is, we
blame them for being culpably ignorant of the moral thing to do
here. So this is not a true case of deep moral ignorance. But my
sense is that we do not blame them merely for being culpably igno-
rant; we blame them for doing the wrong thing, period.
For that matter, think about the way we evaluate the truly wicked,
the likes of Stalin or Mao. Each of them surely thought he was acting
morally, yet we have no trouble condemning them. And surely we
condemn them not merely for having been culpably ignorant of what
morality required of them. We also condemn them for their egre-
gious immorality, without the least bit of concern for their indisputa-
bly sincere belief in their own moral rectitude.1
3
The idea that moral ignorance does not excuse gets indirect sup-
port from the way we think about judicial decisionmaking. Consider
how the task of judging would change if we decided to treat igno-
rance in matters of legal doctrine exactly like ignorance of fact:
1. Suppose ajudge does not know the answer to a legal question.
He will make it up. He will reach for what seems to be the best solu-
tion even if it has low odds of being the right one. Not so with factual
12 See STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AuTHORITY (1974).
is Here, too, my sense is that we do not blame them merely for being culpably
ignorant, but also for doing the wrong thing, period.
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matters. If he cannot make up his mind about the facts, he is obliged
to let the defendant win, to dismiss the case for lack of evidence. But
a dearth of compelling legal arguments is not grounds for letting the
defendant win. If we treated moral and factual ignorance alike, it
would be.
2. The doctrine of precedent would disintegrate if the judge
treated arguments (and their absence) like evidence (and the ab-
sence thereof). He might not be able to decide the case based on
what he had heard today, but if convincing arguments were mar-
shaled in the same kind of case tomorrow, he would be free to decide
such a case differently then.
3. The doctrine of vagueness would become unnecessary. If a
judge cannot decide whether a vague-looking statute covers what the
defendant has done, he would simply say that in that case he has not
been convinced beyond a reasonable doubt (if it is a criminal case)
that the defendant is covered by the statute, and acquit. He would
continue to apply the statute in cases in which he has no (reasonable)
doubt that it applies. Even a statute as vague as one that simply made
it a crime to engage in "terrible conduct" would not be declared
unconstitutional. Its application would simply be confined to cases in
which the judge was sure beyond a reasonable doubt that the defen-
dant had acted terribly.
4. A whole range of subtler, more intricate consequences would
follow as well. For instance, imagine the case in which exculpatory
evidence appears after the defendant already has been convicted in a
criminal case. Exculpatory evidence ordinarily is grounds for reopen-
ing a case. New exculpatory legal arguments are not, yet they would
have to be if we put questions of law and fact on a par.
5. Prosecutorial discretion would be significantly narrowed. Cur-
rently, a prosecutor who wants to argue for a new legal theory is free
to do so. If he presses a case on flimsy evidence, however, he is abus-
ing his discretion. If moral and factual mistakes came to be treated
alike, that asymmetry would have to be abolished.
14
Despite everything I have said, I trust that the idea that factual
and moral ignorance really are not very different probably will con-
14 For a superb exploration of the related issue of burdens of proof as they relate
to issues of law and fact, see Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 859
(1992), and the fascinating replies it elicited from Larry Alexander and Richard
Friedman, see Larry Alexander, Proving the Law: Not Proven, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 905
(1992); Richard D. Friedman, Standards of Persuasion and the Distinction Between Fact and
Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 916 (1992).
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tinue to have a very strong intuitive appeal. There is something
profoundly strange about claiming that the person who acts wrongly
out of unavoidable moral ignorance is to be blamed for his actions. If
the actor has consulted every philosopher and judge on an issue,
followed their advice, or gotten the advice that no one knows what
the answer is, how can we possibly blame him for getting it wrong?
To blame him seems to many downright irrational.
In fact, it is worth noting that one of the most famous Enlighten-
ment arguments for religious tolerance appeals to the intuitive irra-
tionality of treating ignorance in religious, moral, or legal matters any
differently from ignorance in factual matters. The argument comes
in the form of a parable first invented by Giovanni Boccaccio and
presented as one of the many stories in his thirteenth-century classic,
The Decameron. 5 It was later refined and adapted by the eighteenth-
century German playwright Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, who put the
argument into the mouth of the eponymous hero of the best known
German play on religious tolerance, Nathan the Wise. The Jew
Nathan (Melchizedek in Boccaccio's version) comes to "invent" the
parable when he is approached by the Sultan, who wants to intimidate
him into lending him some money on favorable terms. The Sultan's
means of intimidation is to ask the Jew to please tell him, since he is
so wise, which is the right religion and why. Seeking to side-step that
question, the Jew tells the Sultan a story, which, stripped of all poetic
ornament, is this: There once was a very precious ring which, in
addition to being very precious, entitled its bearer to be looked upon
as heir and head of the family. This ring had been passed through
many generations when it came to rest in the hands of a man who
could not make up his mind as to. which of his three equally good
sons should inherit the ring. He solved his dilemma by having a
master craftsman make two perfect copies and handing each son a
ring with the assurance that it was the real one. When he died, the
three sons of course began to quarrel, each claiming to be the right-
ful heir and head of the family. Alas, concludes the Jew:
[F] inding that the rings were so alike that it was impossible to tell them
apart, the question of which of the sons was the true and rightful heir
remained in abeyance, and has never been settled. "And I say to you,
my lord, that the same applies to the three laws which God the Father
,s GIOVANNI BoccAccIo, THE DECAMERON 44 (G.H. McWilliam trans., Penguin
Books, 2d ed. 1995) (n.d.).
'6 GOTrHOLD EPHRAIM LEsING, NATHAN THE WISE act 3, sc. 7 (Bayard Quincy
Morgan trans., Frederick Ungar Publishing Co. 1955) (1799).
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granted to His three peoples, and which formed the subject of your in-
quiry. Each of them considers itself the legitimate heir to His estate,
each believes it possesses His one true law and observes His command-
ments. But as with the rings, the question as to which of them is right
remains in abeyance." 
1
At first glance, there seems to be nothing particularly powerful
about this parable. There seems no very compelling parallel to be
drawn between the three religions and the three rings. Why should
God be conceived to be akin to this irresolute father? Religious
knowledge does not seem to be like a ring that, of necessity, only can
be given to one person. Why did this story satisfy the Sultan? Why is
the telling of it considered such an ingenious response to the Sultan's
query? The ingenuity lies, I think, in the way the story appeals to our
intuitive sense that factual and moral (and doctrinal and religious)
ignorance are on a par. When we cannot settle a factual dispute, we
normally will not be at each other's throats. Instead, we recognize
that there is not enough evidence to determine the truth, and invoke
the rules that are meant to deal with insufficient evidence. Of course,
people often will go for each other's throats when a moral, religious,
or doctrinal matter is at stake. The parable of the rings managed to
convert the moral, religious, doctrinal question of which is the right
religion into the factual question of which is the right ring. And on
the ring question, everyone is willing to be tolerant in the absence of
sufficient evidence.
The intuitive appeal of equating moral and factual ignorance thus
cannot be denied. To be sure, I have tried to show you that a large
number of quite strange implications are entailed by that position,
but I fear they have not been nearly enough to overwhelm the strong
countervailing intuition. Hence, the next Part of this Article will
focus on that task.
III. CAN WE REALLY EVER BLAME THE UNAVOIDABLY IGNORANT?
If, out of genuinely unavoidable ignorance, someone makes what,
in retrospect, turns out to be the wrong judgment call, blaming him
seems like a cruel joke. It seems like holding someone responsible
for murder who was tossed involuntarily on top of another person,
thereby crushing him. To show why it is not necessarily unjust to
blame someone who acted out of unavoidable moral ignorance, I will
7 BoccAccIo, supra note 15, at 44.
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reveal this to be but one manifestation of a more general, highly
counterintuitive, aspect of deontological morality.
To get at this more general aspect, consider the following sche-
matic scenario. Person One and Person Two live in parallel uni-
verses, so to speak. They behave identically in their parallel universes.
Then each comes to a fork in the road. Indeed, they come to the very
same fork in the road. At this fork, they can make a wrong decision
or a right decision. Person One does the wrong thing. Person Two
does the right thing. Which of them is worse? The answer seems to
be self-evident. Indeed, it seems a merely terminological issue-an
analytical truth. It seems clear that Person Two is better than Person
One in the same way that we know it to be true that a bachelor is not
married. Yet, that turns out to be false.
I begin with two simple examples that seem to contradict the
common wisdom. There is much to quarrel about in each of these
examples. Many reasons will suggest why the examples do not in fact
show what they appear to show. But I will not linger to respond to
these doubts here. 8 I do not mean for those examples to prove the
common wisdom wrong. I only mean for them to make it conceivable
that the common wisdom is wrong. Having gotten you to take that
possibility seriously, I then proceed to an actual proof-a proof that
in a deontological system of morality, Person One, who has done
more wrong than Person Two, might nonetheless end up with a
better moral ledger!
My first example derives from William Manchester's biography of
Douglas MacArthur, which describes a certain curious incident early
in MacArthur's career.'9 MacArthur was asked to serve in a noncom-
batant staff position, in which it was felt that his intellect could make
the greatest contribution to the war effort. He politely, but resolutely,
declined. MacArthur wanted to serve in the field. That was where
glory lay; that was where medals could be won. Consider this incident
just a bit more closely. If we believe, as I do, that the bestowal of
medals pretty well tracks moral achievement, we would have to say
that the valorous MacArthur is morally superior to the MacArthur
18 I presently am working on a piece in which I take up each of these possible
exceptions in painstaking detail. See Leo Katz, Preempting Oneself: The Moral
Problems of Self-Manipulation (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
'9 See WILUAM MANCHESTER, AMERICAN CAESAR: DOUGLAS MACARTHUR 91 (1978).
I am assuming that it is predictable from the very outset that he will do more good on
staff but will achieve more glory in the battlefield. There is no element of fortuity
involved here.
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who decides to stay behind and serve on the staff, even though
MacArthur actually might have saved more lives by staying behind,
albeit at little risk to himself, and hence, with little claim to glory. Yet
one also has the intuition that if MacArthur really could have accom-
plished more on staff than in the battlefield, that is where he should
have stayed. If those two intuitions are correct-and at this point
many will simply think one of them to be ill-considered-we would
then have an example of the desired sort. The real MacArthur is
Person One. The hypothetical MacArthur is Person Two. The real
MacArthur makes the wrong decision. The hypothetical MacArthur
makes the right decision. Yet, in the end, the real MacArthur comes
out as morally superior to the hypothetical MacArthur.
My second example initially seems extraordinarily contrived. It
will seem less contrived if I tell you what inspired it: the familiar
problem under the necessity defense as to what we should do if the
person claiming the necessity defense is in some way culpable in
bringing such a predicament about in the first place.
Person One and Person Two both have poisoned five people.
The poison does its work in a curious, but analytically helpful, way.
The poison wrecks the hearts of some patients, the lungs of others,
the kidneys of others yet. As things stand, each of the two sets of five
victims contains one person in need of a heart transplant, two persons
in need of lung transplants, and two persons in need of kidney trans-
plants. At this point, Person One and Person Two have pangs of
conscience. They decide they would like to save their victims. Both
Person One and Person Two now face the familiar predicament of
whether it would be all right to carve up an innocent to save the five.
The answer for a deontologist is the familiar one as well: Of course
not. This then is the fork in the road. Should one cut up one person
for the sake of the many? And one branch of the fork is clearly right;
the other is clearly wrong.
Let us suppose that Person Two decides to do the right thing. He
does not carve up the one for the sake of the many. Therefore, his
five victims die. He is now guilty of five murders. Person One decides
to do the wrong thing. He carves up an innocent person and saves
his five victims. He is now guilty of only one murder and several
attempted murders, presumably a somewhat better ledger. Lest you
have some doubts whether one murder plus five attempts is not as
bad as five murders, we could modify the example slightly. Assume
that Person One only tries to kill four people, two of whom are going
to die unless they get kidney transplants and two of whom are going
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to die unless they get lung transplants. He then assaults two people
and extracts from each a redundant lung and kidney. He is now
guilty of two assaults and four attempted murders. His counterpart,
Person Two, by contrast, is guilty of four murders. Pretty clearly, two
assaults and four attempted murders are less grave than four murders.
To repeat: I acknowledge that these examples invite all sorts of
objections, which I will not here pass by. Instead, I will pass on to my
proof that this sort of thing is an inevitable feature of deontological
moral reasoning.
Consider Person One who commits Bad Act A. After he has
committed Bad Act A, he commits Good Acts B, C, D, E, and F Com-
pare him to Person Two who has committed neither Bad Act A, nor
Good Acts B, C, D, E, and F Which is better? That depends. But one
can certainly imagine Good Acts and Bad Acts such that Person One
would come out ahead of Person Two despite the fact that he started
out with a Bad Act, namely if the Good Acts are sufficiently good,
sufficiently courageous, and beneficial. Assume we are dealing with
such an A, B, C, D, E, and F
Consider now Person Three. Person Three faces a situation in
which he has a choice either to do nothing-commit neither Bad Act
A, nor Good Acts B, C, D, E, and F-or to do both A, and B, C, D, E,
and F He decides to do A so that he can also do B through F How
does he compare with Person One? He did the same as Person One,
except that he did A so that he could do B through F So, he seems a
little better, but certainly no worse than Person One. He thus is
clearly better than Person Two.
But now consider more closely his decision to do A so as to be
able to do B through F Is that a correct decision? Under a deon-
tological regime, it generally will not be. Let A = torturing a child,
and B = a valiant act of rescue of several people, C = the same thing,
but involving other people, D through F= ditto. Torturing a child so
as to rescue several people is impermissible to a deontologist. (To be
sure, most people are threshold deontologists, and if the number of
people to be rescued is sufficiently large, then the tradeoff is permis-
sible. I am assuming that we are below that threshold.) Now it seems
clear that Person Three is making a decision that is morally inferior
to the decision made by Person Two. Yet it is also clear that he comes
out ahead morally.
20
20 Notice that nothing about this paradox depends on the so-called "moral luck"
phenomenon. When first encountering cases of the kind I discuss in this Part, espe-
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This example suggests a way in which we can make sense of our
seemingly conflicting intuitions about moral ignorance. We could
regard the person who acts on the best available moral advice, but still
gets it wrong, in the same light we regard the protagonists of my
various examples. The morality of what he does at the moment he
acts is to be viewed like the morality of the person who declines to cut
up one to save five (whom he tried to poison initially), or of the
hypothetical MacArthur who decides to serve on staff rather than in
combat, or of the hypothetical variant of Person Three who decides
he is not going to commit Bad Act A just to be able to then commit
Good Acts B, C, D, E, and F. He, like they, could be thought to have
acted rightly but, nonetheless, by that self-same right action, to have
blackened his moral ledger. On the face of it, that is an absurd sugges-
tion. What my examples are meant to show is that far from being
absurd, it is an almost inevitable feature of a deontological system of
morality.
CONCLUSION
I have argued that incommensurability often is simply a sign of
ignorance, most frequently ignorance of the answer to difficult moral
questions. When one has to choose between incommensurable alter-
natives, what one is really doing, most of the time, is attempting to
answer a hard moral question. An interesting and unnoticed aspect
of this choice is that if one gets it wrong, and if, with the passage of
time and the achievement of greater moral insight, that becomes
cially when encountering my surgery hypothetical, it is tempting to think that the
paradox therein simply derives from the fact that we attach moral significance to
chance consequences. It can be shown that this is in fact not true of the surgery
example, and I go to great trouble to do that in my forthcoming piece mentioned
above. See supra note 18. But most obviously it is not true of the Good Act-Bad Act
hypothetical. No chance events are involved there; everything happens exactly as
intended.
This is also a good place to correct two misconceptions that frequently obscure an
understanding of deontological morality. The first misconception is that deontolo-
gists necessarily embrace moral luck, that the deontologist necessarily attaches moral
significance to chance consequences. In fact, both kinds of deontologists exist-those
who do, and those who do not, attach such significance. The second misconception is
that a deontologist attaches no significance to consequences, that only the action
component of misconduct is morally relevant. That is not true either. A deontologist
is someone who attaches significance to things in addition to consequences, namely
the way in which a consequence is brought about.
At least the above is true of the kind of deontological morality I am discussing in
this Article. I believe that deontology of this stripe coincides both with our everyday
moraljudgments and with the underlying logic of our criminal law.
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apparent, one still can be condemned for that choice. This condem-
nation is justified even though one really could not help making the
mistake. We see here a surprising vindication of the commonly held
intuition that incommensurability and tragedy are deeply intertwined.
* * * * * *
